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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
GooDYEAR TmE AND RUBBER CoM-
PANY, a eorporation, and HART-
FORD AcciDENT AND INDEMNITY 
CoMPANY, a .corp-oration, 
Plaintiffs, 
YS. 
THE INDUSTRIAL C'oMMISSION oF 
THE STATE OF UTAH and LEE 
JAMES HARRIS, 
Defendarn.ts. 
Case No. H2:50 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
Two ·questions .are herewith presented for review. 
First, was the applicant, Lee James Harris, injured by 
an accident which .arose out 10f or in the course of his em-
ployment 1 Second, may the Co.mmission award com-
pensation .covering permanent los~s of bodily function 
witho~t evidence of permanent injury1 The first question 
more narrowly stated is simply this: Is an employee en· 
titled to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation 
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.A!ct under the .following .circumstances, to-wit: when he 
leaves the premis-e1s of his employ·er, g1oes to his home for 
his dinner, .and, incidentally, to give his sister a ride on 
a motor.cycle, and is injured o·n. the public highway while 
returning to his employer's pla~ce o.f busine~ss ~ 
In considering the following statement of facts, upon 
which there is no dispute, two questions must he kept in 
mind. First, at the time of the accident, what duty was 
Harris performing that benefited or furthered the in-
terests of his employers~ Second, at the tlime of the 
accident, who had ·Control of his activities~ 
It is earnestly believed that this ~c·ourt will not sus-
tain this decision of the Industrial !Commission, which 
has departed from .a fundamental a·nd well-settled Tule 
of law which, simply stated, is this: That when an em-
ployee goes on a. personal errand of his own, to-wit: to 
get a meal at his home, he departs from his employment 
and is IliO't covered. 
The material facts which are undisputed are briefly 
these: Harri·s was a part-time employee, having been 
employed only five days. On the day in question, May 8, 
19·39, near the close of the day's work, a. rush job had 
come in and he was instructed to remove the wheels from 
this truck while his foreman, Ed 'Sehneider, and another 
employee went after the ·new wheels. After the foreman 
had left, Harris helped himself to a motorcycle belonging 
to plaintiff, Goodyear Tire ,& Rubber Company, .and left 
the premisHs, ais he says, to get his supper, but as was 
also proven, to give his· ·sister a ride. A few n1inutes 
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later, 'Yhile returning· to V\7ork, he Lost eontroLof the same 
and he c.rashed into a. house, injuring himself. 
The theory of 'vorkmen 's compensation is itself a 
departure from the ·Common law rule, which did not re-
quire one to pay £or another',s injury unle·ss· caused by 
fault. The cases limit this payment of eompensation 
without fault to a.ecidents whi~h· arise out of or happen 
in the course of the employment. Manifestly, the decision 
of the Industrial .c~ommission requiring the employer to 
compensate the employee for an aecident which happened 
away from the employer's premises, wholly di·s-connected 
from his business and at a time when the employer [had 
no control and direction over the empltoyee, is contrary 
to law. The de-cision o.f the .Q'ommission herein is directly 
opposed to a \Yell-settled rule of law of this state. 
THE F'ACT~S IN THE· CAS·E. 
A's applied t'o the first question, it conclusively ap-
pears that Ed .Schneider was the foreman in charge of 
the station of the Goodyear Tire & R.ubber c~ompany, 
and that the applicant understood such was the case is 
apparent from his testimony in the transcript page 11. 
Again at transcript page 7 a~ppea.rs the following testi-
mony ·Of the applicant: ''Ed ·Schneider wa·s in .charge .of 
the 1Service department ~here I was working,'' and ''he 
had never give·n me any instructions about using the 
motorcycle at any time.'' 
,Ed Schneider testified that he was the assistant 
service manager and tihat Harris was working under his 
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direction. (·Tr. 14) He further testified, "My instruc-
tions were, when I left to get the wheel1s, that Mr. Sims 
and Mr. Ericks·on were to get lunch and while I was gone, 
he (Harris) was to take the wheels ,off the truck and 
after I .got. back and the other boys got hack, we would 
let him (Harris) go. I told him wihen I got ha·ck and 
the ·other boys got back, he and I would go.'' (Tr. 3'5) 
I told him to stay there until I got back ( Tr. 36) ''and 
against instructions, he left the premises.'' (Tr. 39) He 
ha·d been directed to take off the inside nuts, but ''he 
left before that was finished.'' ('Tr. 40) 
At page 15 of the transcript appears ~he following 
testimony by the applicant: 
Q. Mr. Schneider was the one who employed you? 
A. Y·es. · 
Q. He didn't say you could take the m>o·torcycle to 
go home or go to supper~ 
A. No, he didn't. 
There is nothing in the record that even intimates 
that the employer ·sent Harris home for his supp·er. On 
tihe ·contrary, the evidence ~shows that he v1olated the in-
structions given to him by .assistant manager .Schneider, 
who was in .. charge of the work, to remain at work taking 
off the wheels, until ~1e. could return with new ones, and 
then both of them would g;o· to supper. It was a rush 
job and H~rris was so informed by Mr. Schneider, and 
yet he left without ·completing t:he "\vork laid out for him 
and vv.hich he \·\,.as directed to do pri~o·r to Mr. Schneider's 
return. 
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There is not a particle of evidence in the record tha.t 
the employer or anyone in authority in its behalf gave 
the applicant permission to take the motorcycle home 
with him, (immaterial as it is to the issues in this case) 
-or that the applicant, while away from the· p:remi~s-es 
getting his supper, was doing anything whatsoever in the 
coul"se •of his employment or of use or b€nefit to his 
e-mployer's business. 
Sneh being the evid.ence, what basis, then, is there 
for a finding by the Commission that the applicant, at 
the time -of the accident, was within the scope of his em-
ployment~· Certainly fuere is no comp·etent 'or sub .... 
sta.ntial evidenice in the record to support any !Such 
finding. 
As to the ·second question, raised herein, to-wit: 
''May the ~c·ommission award compensation covering 
per.manent loss of bodily function without evidence of 
permanent injury~" it should suffice to s.ay at this point 
in the brief, under a discussion ·of the facts, that there is 
not a. scintilla of .evidence in the record on this point. 
The law applica;hle to the same will be discussed later on 
in the brief under subdivision II. 
T~HE D,E·C'lSION OF ·THE C10·MMLS.SI~ON IS 
CON'TRARY TO LAW. . ·'· '· 
I. The evidenee here shows without contradiction 
that the injury did not arise out •Of or in' the course of 
applicant's employment, and there iS' no evidence to sup-
port any 'such finding tha.t it did. It is a fundamental 
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and well-recognized rule of law in this jurisdiction as 
WBll as elsewhere that an employee injured on the way 
to and from meals is not entitled to ecompensation,. for 
he is serving primarily a purpose of his ·Own. 
II. ·There is no competent or substantial evidence 
in the r.e·cord, and, in fact, no evidence, to support the 
finding of the Oommi,ssion that the applicant ''while in 
the course of his duties as helper, sustained accidental 
injury,'' and that he now suffers some permanent partial 
loss of the use of his left leg below the knee as a result 
of such injury; but, on the contrary, ~such findings are 
predicated solely upon surmise, speculation, .and oon-
jecture. 
Therefore it is apparent that the 'Commission's eon-
elusions of law herein are contrary to law, and are 
unsupported by any finding of fact based up·on competent 
or su!b.stantial ·eviden·ce, and therefore the decision i~s 
contrary to law in its entirety. 
I. 
THE INJURY DID NOT ARISE OUT OF OR liN COURSE OF EMPLOY-
MENT. 
T:he decision of the Commission herein is contrary 
to the rule laid down by this eourt in the case of Fidelity 
and Casualty Compan1y v. Commission, 79 Utah 189, 8 
P. (2d) 617, wherein this question was pre,sented to it 
and the award therein made hy the Industrial C·ommis-
sion was annulled and set aside. The rule announced 
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by this court in that case is in full accord 'vith the estab-
Tished authorities e1se~·e(re. Undoubtedly . tthe error 
made herein is .accounted for because of the pressure of 
work upon the Commission, and had reference been made 
to the decisions of this Court, and if all the memher·s of 
the Commission had had an opportunity to pass on same, 
the result arrived at vvould have been. exactly opp,nsite.· 
The facts in this ·case, as h·ereinhefor.e pointed out, 
demonstrate that the employee was not -acting in the 
course of his ·employment when injured, so that the de-
cision of th.e ·C'ommi,ssi~on, if sustained, would have the 
effect of extending the liability of employers not only in 
compensation, but also in personal injury eases involving 
third .parties, to situations where the ·empl,oy-ee was not 
acting in the course of his employment. 
It is evident that a decision that an employee is en-
titled t.o Workmen ',s ·Compensation Insurance· when in-
jured at a time when he is not under th.e contr,nl or right 
of ·Control of his employer, nor in any way limited in his 
activities by reason of his .employment, in facst, holds 
that it is not necessary t:hat the employee shall have been 
acting in the .course ,of his employment, to be entitled to 
Workmen's Compensation for injury. 
'The decision of the Industrial Commission 1n this 
case fails to recognize that .an employee is not acting in 
the course of his emp1oy:rne·nt vYhen he is going to his 
plac-e of ·employment or coming back therefrom. The 
''going and coming" rule is well established, not only 
in thi's state, but .el.seWihere, .and the evidence in this case 
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demonstrates -that the rule is fully appli~cable to the case 
at bar. To reverse such a well-established rule would 
be to~ unsettle the law and add s·erious burdens to indus-
try not contemplated by the L1egisl.ature and unwar-
ranted in justice and ·principle. 
While in the ·CasH of Ocean. Accident arnd Guaramty 
4 Company v. Industrial Accider~At Commission, 173 ·Cal. 
313, it is recognized that it is a. nHce,ss.ary part of his 
employment that the employe~ shall go to and return 
from his place of labor, the Court said: 
'''Therefore, an ·employee going to and from 
his place of employment is not r.endering any 
·service and hegins to render such service only 
when, as has been ·said, arriving at the place of 
his emp1oyment he pr•O'Ceeds to use some instru-
mentality provided, by means of which he equally 
places himself in a. position to perform his tasks.'' 
This rule wa·s later affirmed hy ·01hief Ju,stice Waste 
in the later case of California Casualty lnd.emnity Ex-
oha.nge v. Industr~a1l Accident Comm,ission, 190 Cal. 433. 
This ·court in the case of N or.th Poifn,t c:onsol. I rr. Co. 
v. Industrial Commissi.on ·Of Utah, et .a,Z., 61 Utah 421, 214 
P. 22., held that an employee was not protec~ted while on 
his way to work even though he had been disapp~ointed 
in receiving transp•OTtation promi,sed by his forem:an 
without authority. T'he following is taken from the 
syllabus in that case. 
''Injuries to an ·employee .struck by an auto-
mobile while riding his bicycle on a street of his 
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own selection on his way to 'vDrk, after his fore-
man failed to get a.n automobile to carry him, as 
he had stated he might do, did not arise in the 
course or out of the employment within th·e Work-
men '!s Compensation Act, the foreman having 
undertaken to provide transportation as a. mere 
accommodation with~out .authority from the em-
p1oyer, who was not obligated to do so. 
''''Where a.t the tim·e of the injury the em-
ployee is engaged in a voluntary act not accepted 
by, or kn~own to, his employer and outside of the 
duties for which he is employed, the injury cannot 
be said to be in the ·Course of the employment.'' 
71 C·. J. 663. 
This fundamental principle is sustained by .authori-
ties in practically every sta.te in the United States, inc1ud-
ing the recent Utah ease of Ric"4 v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 80 Utah 511, 15 P. (2d) 641. 
The following principle, well sustained by authority, 
is found in 71 C. J ., page 638: 
''Nevertheless a de:fi.ni tion widely adopted is 
that an injury to an employee arises in the course 
of hi~s· employment when it occurs within the peri~od 
of his employment, at a. :pla.ee where he may rea-
sonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling 
the duties of his employment or engaged in doing 
something incidental to it.'' 
An .attempted extension of the doctrine to protect 
an employee while on his way to or f:vom work was very 
vigorously made in the leading ·case of Postal Telegraph 
& Cable Co. v. lrr1Adustria.Z Accident Co.1nmission, 37 P. 
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(2d) Page 442. ;This ·Court will recognize the importance 
of that ease, .and very seld()m indeed are so many 
eminent counsel called into a. legal controversy as there 
were in tha.t case. The reason therefore is because of 
the seriousness of the que·stion a:nd the attempt to bring 
under the coverage of the Workmen's C~ompensation 
.&ct, .accidents not arising in the -course of the employ-
ment. 'The facts in that case al,so involved a moto-r-
cycle ·opera ted by an _em·ployee. The injured man was on 
no special errand for the employer and had not yet 
reached his place of employment where his duties ibegan. 
The facts are identical in that regard with the -case under 
consideration. !Said the ·C:ourt: 
'·'When an employee is off duty, the relation 
of employer and employee is susp:ended and does 
not reattach until the employee resumes the mas-
ter's wo,rk. '' 
The Court further said: 
''He could not only deviate for the conveni-
~enc.e of his friend, but could also perform any ta,sk 
for himself or for another at any time before 
reaching the .pla:ce where his duties were to begin. 
This hoiding is in accord with the overwhelming 
weight of a.uthori ty wihere the principle involved 
is identical with that found in the instant case." 
The award was annulled. 
In the case of Covey-Ba.Zlard Motor Co., et a.Z., v. 
lndustri.al Com.mission, et al., 64 Utah 1, 227 Pac. 1028, 
involving a salesman wJl,ile riding home in his own auto-
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.m,ohile after attending- a meeting at the office of th~e 
employer, it \Yas held that injury was n·ot comp·ensable 
as arising in the- course of the employment. 
In the case of Denver & Rio Gratnde R. R. Co. v·. 
Indu.str1:az Commission., et al., 72 Utah 19~9, '269 Pac. 513, 
the company furnished transportation from the section 
house, but the accident happened before the employee got 
to the section house and in the sam·e ve'hi.cle driven by the 
s.ame employ~ee that was later to take him fr·om the sec-
tion house to the place of work. The court, after review-
ing the authoritie.s, held that the risk of going to the 
~section house was the employe~e 's and, there:Bore, tihe 
award .of the Utah Industrial Commission was annulled. 
Announeing the pri·nci ple, this court said: 
''Before .arrival at the section house in the 
morning neithe-r (employee nor truck driver) were 
under_ the icon trol or direction of the empl·nyer. '' 
In the case of Greer v. Industrial Commission., et al., 
74 Utah 379, 279 Pac. 900, an employee carrying a saw 
which he had sharpened at home was injured, but the 
.court held that he was not protected while on his way 
to work merely hecaus!e he wa~s carrying a saw belong-
ing to the company and which it was his duty to keep 
·sharp, as this was only incidental and the employ~ee did 
nnt come within any of the excepti·ons to the general rule. 
Thi~s C~ourt said : 
''In this case the deceased was not injured 
while ~sharpening the saw at .his home. The acci-
dent did not occur while he was actually engaged 
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in the performance of a duty for the employer. 
·The dangers of the street between his home and 
thje stoickyards were not incidental to his em-
ployment, but were dangers common to all.'' 
:Surely.by this te.st the applicant's case herein falls, 
beeause h·e ~as not performing any duty for his em-
pLoyer. It thus appears that the decided Utah cases are 
in full agreement with the general. rule .and are decisive 
of the issue here in f.avor of .plaintiffs .and against the 
decision and award of the ·Commission. 
The fa:ct.s in the case ·of Fidelity a:nd Casua·lty Com-
pa;ny v. Industria.[ Commission (supra), in which this 
Court reversed an award of compensation made hy t'he 
Industrial ·C•ommission made out .a much stronger claim 
for compensation than do the facts herein. Ther·e the 
employ.ee was required to have and use a bicycle and was 
required to take a bicycle hom·e after working hours 
ibecause his first duty in the morning was to go directly 
from home to the Semloh Hotel where he picked up films 
for development .and which he was required to take to hi·s 
place of empioyment. This hotel was on his dir.ect r•oute 
to his place of employment. While riding his bicycle 
from home to 1the hotel, and before reaching the hotel, 
he was injured. This Court held that ;his. 0o-urse of em-
ployment did not -com-mence until he arrived at his place 
of employment, and that not having reached the ·Bem1oh 
Hotel, where his duties first began, (he had not yet en-
·,tered upon his duties for his employer and was not, 
therefore, acti_ng in the eourse of his employment. This 
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Court pointed out in that case, that .at the time the 
employee 'vas injured he was in no sense under the 
control of his employer, indicating that in ord·er for the 
relationship of an empl,oyer ;and employee to exist there 
must he control or the right of control, and that Without 
this there is no employm~ent and neees,sarily no course 
of empl•oyment. 
The Court s.aid : 
''It is a general rule of law that an injury 
sus:tained by an empl10yee while ·going to oT return-
ing from his place of work upon his own initiative 
in a. conv;eyance of his own choosing and on his 
own time is not an injury arising out oif .or in the 
·course of 'his employment and heruc.e an injury 
thus sustained is not eompensahle under W·ork-
men 's CompenS"ati•on Acts. This court is com-
mitted l·o such doc:trifn.e.'' (Italies ours.) 
"North Point Consol. lrr. Co. v-. Industrial 
Con'IJm(ission, 61 Utah 421, '214 P. 2·2·; 
Greer v. Industrial Com.rntission, 
74 Utah 379, 2.79· P. 900 ; 
De~Y~;ver &; Rio Grande W. R. Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm., 72. Utah 199, 269 P. 512, 
62 A. L. R. 143-6; 
Covey-Ballard Mo·tor C·o. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 64 Uta~h 1, 227 P~ ·1028." 
In this cas,e, just as in ·the ease above referred to, 
the employee was at peTfect liberty to take wha~tev.er 
·course he desired to reach his .pla!ce·. of employm~ent and 
a~s the C•orurt said, ''the time when he was to enter upon 
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hi·s- employment had not yet arrived.'' J.n that case, just 
as in this ca•s-e, the employe-e was not under the protec-
tion of the act when he was se¥eral miles a.w·ay from his 
plruce of employment and ·on his way to work. There is 
no rea.s,on whatever for applying a different rule in the 
instant eas·e than in the ease ahove referred to. 
In the instant case it was wholly immaterial to the 
empl·oyer where the employee should have hi·s meals and 
what means of conveyancle, if !any, he should use in going 
to such pla.c•e. Certainly it was not responsible £or his 
use ·of the motorcycle ~or the manner in whieh he oper-
ated it. Where the employe·e went to obtain food was no 
·eoncern . of his employer and the ·manner in which he 
·chose to g~o there was entirely his ·own selection and not 
that rof his -e-mployer. 
During the time that the •employee was absent in 
going 'to his (home his employment was suspended and 
during such time no act of his can be .eonsidered as oc-
curring in the course ·of his employment, either for the 
purpose. of estaplishing a right ·to eompensa.tion or to 
justify an action by a third party agajnst the employer 
£or the a.c.t.s of ~the employee. In driving the motorcycle 
h·ome he ac.ted as a free agent a?d rhis method and course 
of travel w~ere in no way eontrrolled by his employer. 
When inj-ured, he was on no errand for his employer and 
was neither bound to render it further serviee nor was 
he subje-ct to its .further directions until he returned to 
the premis·e.s £nr work. As said hefore, the relation of 
the employer .and employee was suspended. T.h~ere was 
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at the time of the accident, ·no employment, as ~the term 
is used in the statute. 
It is uniformly held that to entitle an employe·e to 
compensation for an injury he must prove that he was 
performing a service for his emp·Zoyer. In going to a:nd 
from his home the employee in this ca.s·e was performing 
a service for himself. Th,er·e is, therefore, no basis for 
taking this case out of the "going and coming" rule. 
It is apparent from the testim,ony that the employee 
in tihis case took the motorcycle without the peT·mission 
of his ·employer, so that he might have a. means of trans-
portartion to his own ;home to obtain ·something to eat 
and to give his sister a ride. That was his own p·ersonal 
business. If he .had been injured while walking to or 
from his employer's premises, it is certain that he would 
not then have been in the ·course of his empl,nymen t. 
Does the fact that he took his empl,oyeT 's motorcycle, 
without ·permissi•on, change the situation in any way~ He 
was not insured generally against ·accident while work-
ing .for hi·s ·employer. At home or on tihe street he may 
meet with an aec.ident not arising out .of or in the course 
of his employment. The act does not cover such cases. 
The ·employee g-ets up in t:he morning, dresses hims·elf, 
eats, tha:t he may he able to work, and go·es to work 
bec:ause ·of his employtnent; yet, if he meet·s with an acci-
dent heiore arriving a.t the employer '.s .premises, tiha.t is 
not a risk of his occupation, but of life generally. He was 
not in.jured while on duty nor in his working h~nurs nor 
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q!l his way to or from his duty within the pTemis·es of 
th:e employer. 
It is manifest from the evidence that ~the employee 
took the motorcycle as a matter of eonvenience to himself 
and for his own pleasure, and t~his too, without the con-
sent of his employer. He was neither required nor 
directed to go home f,o,r his supper, nor to use the em-
ployer's motorcyc.le for that purpose. On the contrary, 
ihe violat·ed the instructions given him to eontinue with 
his work in removing the wheels fr,om the truck and to 
remain on the premises of his employer until such time 
as his boss could return with new whe-els, at which time 
he had been told he might then go to supper. 
As- was said in the case of Johnson v. Sta.te H'igh~v·ay 
Oom.mission, 134 Atl. 5·64: · 
"·The petit~oner's accident did not arise in 
~the ·course of ·or out of his ·employm·ent any more 
than did .a.n accidental injury received after he 
returned from his day's work, and while he was 
removing his working clothes in ihis own home, 
preparing him·self for his evening meal and night's 
rest.'' 
.A .pr,op·er appli-cation of the above established prin-
ciple must necessarily lead to the <C~onclusion that the 
injury in the :cas:e at ;bar did not ·occur in llie courS"e of 
employment. 
'There ar.e numerous ,other authorities from many 
jurisdictions, ~ut enough !has heen cited from •our own 
Court to c:learly define the p·rinciple upon which the 
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decision here ·should be based. It is· simply· this,, as set 
out in the ease of Ocean Accident & Gua,ranty ·Co. · v. 
Industrial .A.acideml Commission, (supra): 
'''!But it is to be noted that the right to an 
·a:\vard is not founded upon the faic.t that rthe injury 
grows out of and is incidental to his employment. 
It is founded upon the fact that the service h,e is 
rendering at the time of ~the injury grow·s out ·of 
and is incidental to the employment. Therefore, 
the employ:ee going to and from his place of ·em-
ployment is not rendering .any servic:e and begins 
to render suC'h service only when, as has been 
said, arriving at the place ·of his employment, he 
proceeds to use some instrumentality provided, 
by means of \Yhich he immedia,tely places himself 
in a positi~on to perform his tasks. 'Such beyond 
·question is the reasoning of the cases .and the 
meaning of their adjudication * * *. '' 
In the 'Case ·of Ha,rtford Accident.&; Indemnity C?m-
pany, et al., v. Lodes, (Okla.) 19133, 22 .P. ('2d) 861, i~t was 
held that an ·employee engaged to haul wa~t~er for his 
emp1oyer's gin and who was injured when the team ran 
away while he was returning to the gin after having gone 
home for dinner wa.s not entitled to :eompensation because 
the injury ''did not arise •out of or in the cours:e of his 
employment. '' The .court said at page 363 : 
''T-o ·eonstitute an injury ~.rising out of ·and 
in the .course of employment t!here must be exist-
ing at the tim·e of the injury the rela.tionsihip of 
master and servant between employer .and em-
ployee and ~such emp1o~yee cannot bring himself 
within the ~provisions of the Workm·en's ·C~om­
pensation LaV\r for an accidental personal injury 
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sustained by him unless at ~he_ time of ~he injury 
he is on some substantial m1ssron for 'h1s employ-
er gr.owing out ,of or incidentally or specifically 
connected V\rith such employment. He must be 
rendering some service to his master at the time 
·of the injury and he· there by pl_a.ces himself in a 
pa:sition whereby he a.s·sumes h1s task under the 
relationship of master and servant. See Oldham 
v. ,southwestern Surety Ins. Co., 1 Calif. Indus-
trial ~ccident Commission De~cisi~ons (No. 171914) 
7; Oeean Accident & 'G. 1C,o. v. Industrial Accident 
·C'ommission, 173 Cal. 313, 159· P. 1041, L. R. A. 
19117 B, 33r6. 
In the light of 'the foregoing we conclude 
that respondent a.t the time of the- injury was not 
rendering any service to his master and did not 
sustain an injury arising out of and in the eourse 
of his employment. ' ' 
Under analogous ·circumstan·ces the same result was 
reached by the Supreme 'C·ourt of V.ermont in K neelarnd 
v. Barker (Vt.), 135 Atl. 8. 
The same conclusion wa.s reached by the ~C:ourt of 
Appeals of Kentucky in the case ~of In,lwnd Gas Corpo7'a-
tion v. Fraser, 55 S. W. (2d) 26. In that !case the court 
discussed first the general ''going and coming'' rule 
and held that because at the time of the .accident the 
employee was driving his automobile for his .own purpose, 
to-wit, :to transport him.self from his home to the place 
where his empl,oyment would begin, and that the mere 
fact that he required his automobile in his duties or that 
he- had in his automobile the equipment ·of the company, 
which 1he n·eeded to perform his services, was wholly 
immaterial in determining whether he was then in the 
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course of his empl·oyment. In that case it clearly 
appeared, as it doe's in this ease, that the ·employee was 
using·· his ovvn means of conveyance as a convenience in 
transporting him~self from his home to his work and 
suffered an injury \Yhile he was so engaged. In the ease 
last referred to, there \Ya.s more reason than in the case 
at bar for holding that the employee was at the time 
in the course of his employment, because Vhe employee 
in that ease vvas required to use his own automobile in 
which he transported equipment belonging to the c'om-
pany needed in his work. Such was also the .situation 
in Chernick's case, 189 Northeastern 800 (Mass. 1934), 
wherein the Court said at page 801: 
''It is now elementary that the ·Compensa-
tion Act (G. L. ( Ter. Ed.) c. 152) does not extend 
to cover employees going to and coming :from 
their work, or when, as here, they do not have 
work assigned to be performed elsewhere until 
instructed at the ·nffice. McNicol's c·ase, 215 
Mass. 497, 498, 102 N. E. 697, L! R. A. 1916A 306; 
Rourke's Case, 237 Mass. 360, 129 N. E. 603, 13 
A. L. R. 546." 
As we have heretofore said, the employee in the 
case at bar, at the time of the accident, was not engaged 
lin or ruhout the furtherance of the business or affairs 
of his employer nor wa.s he under the control of th~ 
employer. The employer had not assumed any obliga-
tion for the transportation of its employees. It had no 
concern whatever in the transportation or the means 
of transportation of employees to and from their place 
of work. The accident to the applicant did not result 
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from a risk or hazard, which w·as necessarily or ordin-
arily or reasonably inherent or incident to his work. 
All the authorities have repeatedly held that a distinct 
pre-requisite to the right of compensation is that the 
employee. rruist :have been· performing' a service' 'to his 
employer at the time of the injury, and that the employer 
had the right to contr·ol and direct him. 
In this case, it is obvious that the injury to the 
applicant, Harris, did not take place in the course of his 
employment; nor was he at the time of the accident 
performing any service incidental to ·or growing out o.f 
his employment; nor \v.as he acting in the course thereof. 
The applicant chose his own means of ·conveyance 
for the purpose of going to obtain his supper. There 
was no agreement on the part of the employer to trans-
port any employee to or from work. At the time of 
the accident he was performing no duty incidental to his 
employment. The matter of where he should eat his 
lunch was his ·own individual affair. He chose to eat it 
at his home and selected his .own means of transpor-
tation. The applicant incurred a. danger of ·his own 
choosing and one altogether ·outside of his employment. 
The act ·Qf ,_~he applicant i:rl going to his own home and 
choosing his own means· of conveyance was entirely 
personal. He selected his oWn. time and place to eat and 
during the time that he selected, his employer asserted 
no authority oyer him. and derived no benefits from his 
acts. 
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Conclusively sustaining plaintiff's P·oint One, that 
an employee injured on the way to and from meals is 
not entitled to ·C.Onlpensation, beeause ilie is serving 
primarily a purpose -of hi~s own, are the following cases, 
the facts in "\Yhich eoincide "\Yith those in the ease under 
rev1ew. 
Honnold on Workman'e Compensation 
Acts, Sec. 107 page 358. to 361; 
Boyd's Workma.n's Compensation Acts, 
Sec. 481, page 1061 ; 
Hills v. Blair, 
182 Michigan 20, 148 N. W. 243; 
Haggard's Case, 
234 Mass. 330, 125 N. E. 5·61; 
London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Ind. 
Ace. Com., 190 Cal. 587, 213 Pac. 977; 
Pearce v. Ind. Ace. Comm., 
299 Ill. 161, 132 N. E. 440; 
Clark v. Voorhees, 
231 N. Y. 14, 131 N. E. 553; 
Jolvnson v. Smith, 
'263 N. Y. 10, 188 N. E. 140; 
Clapp's Parking Station v. Ind. Accident 
·Com., 51 C'al. App. 624; 197 P. 369. 
Scott Tobacco v·. ·Cooper, 
258 Ky. 795, 81 s .. W. (2d) 588; 
Jack v. Morrow Mfg. Co., 
185 N. Y. Supp. 588; 
Sou.thern Surety Co. v. Gallowa.y, 
89' ~Okla. 45, 2.13 P. 850; 
Taylor v. Binswwnger and Co., 
130 V a. 545, 107 S. E. 649; 
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0 hrm.ru,nd v. I nd~ C.om~·, 
.211 Wis. 153, 246 N. W. 589; 
Ru.sh Canst. Co. v. Woodward, 
14 P. (2d) 409. 
In Ha·gg·ar·d's Q.a.se, supra, a teamster, who, with 
his team, was hired by a city to do general hauling, 
was injured .while eating his lunch. On the day in 
question he was hauling coal from a pile near a railroad. 
It did not appear that he received any orders from 
·his employer except as to places of delivery or receipt 
of l.oads. As his team was being fed near the coal pile 
he sat down on a railroad track to eat his own lunch, 
leaning against a railroa:d car. While he was sitting 
there, the car against which he was leaning was moved 
unexpectedly when bumped by another ear, and claimant 
was injured when he rolled under the car. In holding 
that the accident did not arise out of claimant's em-
ployment, the court said that he 
'' eho.se 'to go to 1a dangerous place where he 
had no business to go, incurring a danger of his 
own choosing and one altogether outside any 
reasonable exercise of his employment, and the 
act in which he was engaged had no relation to 
his employment.' '' 
The claim was dismissed. 
In C~ark v. Voorhees, supra, claimant sought com-
pensation for the ·death of a salesman employed by a 
wholesale fruit and vegetable merchant. It appeared 
that he was killed by a motor truck while eros·sing the 
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street from his employer's place of business to. a res-
taurant for the purpose of having his lunch. In revers-
ing· an avvard of con1pensation, the court held that the 
accident neither arose out of nor in the course of de-
cedent's employment. 
The Court said : 
''When the decedent left the employer's place 
of business for the purpose stated, and while 
walking in the street he was not ·doing anything 
which he was employed to do; nor wa.s it anything 
incident to or connected with the employment. 
It was no mo.re a part of his employment than it 
would have been had he started for his own home 
for the purpose of getting his breakfast. The 
business of the employer ended when he got into 
the street. (Armstrong, Whilworth & c·o. v. Red-
ford, 1920 App. Cas. 737; Davidson v. M. Robb, 
1918 App. Cas. 304). While on the way to the 
restaurant he was engaged in his own personal 
affairs. 
"This ·court has recently held that when an 
employee was injured while on his way to the 
place where he was to render service such injuries 
did not arise out of the e·mployment and were 
not connected therewith. (Matter :o.f Kowalek v. 
N. Y. Consolidated R. R. Co., 229 N. Y. 489; 
Pierson v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 184 
App·. Div. 678; affd., 227 N. Y. 666; Matter of 
·Schultz v. Champion ·Welding & Mfg. Co., supra). 
Also, where a. workman left the employer's prem-
ises to go. to his home for dinner. (Matter of 
Mcinerney v. Buffalo & S. R. R. Corporation, 225 
N.Y. 130)." 
The case of Ohrmund v. Ind. Comm., supra, involved 
a claim for injuries sustained by an automobile mechanic 
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in an accident while returning from lunch at his home 
to work overtime :on Saturday afternoon .. He was given 
permission to use his employer's car to go to lunch, and 
was told to hurry back. In reversing judgment which 
affirmed an award of compensation, the court held that 
claimant's injuries were not compensable, since at the 
time of the accident he was not performing services 
growing out of and incidental to his employment within 
the meaning of the statute. 
The court said : 
'·'It is difficult to imagine what services the 
employee rendered to his employer in going home 
for this meal. During that period he was on his 
own time, he was subject to no control while away, 
he performed no act which in the slightest degree 
advanced his employer's interests. In hurrying 
back he was not rendering a service, he was re-
turning t.o. a place where he was required to 
present himself for the purpose ·of future service. 
It was a part of his duty as an emp1oyee to pre-
sent himself at the place where the service was to 
be rendered. The master had not agreed to trans-
port him and did not transport him. Therefore 
the relation of employee and employer did not 
exist, until he returned to the place where, by 
the term of employment, he was required to per-
. form. service. Geldnick v. ·Burg, 202 Wis. 209, 
231 N. W. ·624. This ease is ruled clearly by 
Bloom v. Krueger, 182 Wis. 29~ 195 N. W. 851. 
Speaking for the ·court in that case, Doerfler J. 
said, 'The controlling fact in the ·case, which 
stands ·out fo·remost above all others consists of 
the employee's use of the truck solely for the 
purpose of enabling him to obtain his noonday 
meal. Assuming that the employer ·either ex-
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truck f.or this purpose, such use was and· must 
be deemed to have been solely for the employee's 
benefit during a period of time while the relation~ 
ship of Inaster and servant was su;s-pended.'' -
The foregoing authorities demonstrate the fallacy 
of confusing an act done by an employee f.or his own 
benefit and preparatory to his work with an act done 
in the course of his employment. 
II. 
NO EVIDENCE OF PERMANENT INJURY. 
As hereinbefore stated, there is absolutely no evi-
dence whatsoever in the record by a physician !or anyone 
else to the effect that the injury to the applicant's leg 
is permanent. Nevertheless, the Commission, in the 
absence of any such evidence, in its finding No. II found 
as a fact that the applicant "now suffers some perman-
ent partial loss of the use of his left leg below the knee 
as a result ·of the injury ·of May 8, 1939," and in its 
conclusions of law concluded that the plaintiffs herein 
should pay ''compensation ·Covering permanent loss of 
bodily function, if any, resulting from the said injury, 
the degree .of which is to be determined at the pr·oper 
time.'' 
''A failure to sustain a burden of proof ean-
not be remedie-d by a finding based upon guess, 
conjecture, or surmise.'' Glass on Workman's 
Compensation Law, p.p. 39-40. 
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"The burden rests up·on the employee to 
prove the facts as to the character and extent of 
the injury justifying, under the terms of the 
statute, an award in the amount that he seeks, 
whether it be for a total disability, permanent 
or temporary, or for a permanent or temporary 
partial disability.'' 71 C. J. 1070. 
In view of the fact, as stated, that there is no 
evidence whatsoever in the reeord with reference to 
permanent injury, such finding and conclusion of law 
with reference to the same are without any basis or 
foundation whatsoever and the result of mere surmise, 
speculation, and conjecture, and on this ground alone, 
the decision of the Industrial Commission herein should 
be annulled and set aside. 
THE DECISION HEREIN WOUL·D RENDER THE 
EMPLOYER LIABLE TO THIRD· PERS·ONS FOR 
ANY INJURIES RECEIV'ED THROU~GH THE 
NEGLIGENCE OF THE EMPL·OYEE. 
Dis-cussion of the above point, while not strictly 
pertinent to the case at bar, is vital, because an incorrect 
decision of the instant case would have as one of its 
far-reaching evil consequences the upsetting of a well-
settled branch of law. 
If logically carried out, it would follow necessarily 
that if the applicant, Harris, was in t~he .course of his 
employment, when he was returning to work on the 
motorcycle, and he had negligently injured a third per-
son, instead of himself, that such third person would 
be entitled to recover damages from the employer. 
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The absurd results that "'"ould follo'v a decision that 
an employet• is aeting in the eourse of his employment 
while transporting himself to work, '~lhether it be in his 
own conYeyance or his employer's conveyance, and even 
though it was necessary that he use such conveyance in 
performing his duties is illustrated in the case of 
Carroll v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 17 P. 
(2d) 49. In that case 0 'Brien was employed by the 
telegraph company as a motorcycle messenger, whose 
duty it \Yas to deliver messages and packages as dire-cted. 
On the day in question he obtaine-d permission from his 
employer to get some horn brackets for the purpose of 
attaching to his motorcycle, and on his return from so 
doing injured the plaintiff, who sought to hold the de-
fendant telegraph company responsible. 
This was a case where a third party sought to hold 
the employer liable in damages. The facts are similar 
to the case at bar. The court said at page '50: 
''But it is argued that the boy in order to 
hold his position and p·erform his duties, was 
required to have a motorcycle in proper repair 
and the master was concerned in seeing to it 
that the employee was so equipped. Likewise t·o 
hold his position the boy would require food, 
·clothing, proper shelter and perhaps medical care, 
and other things too numerous to mention. ·C·ould 
it be reasonably argued that, if, after a hard day's 
work the boy was on his way home to obtain 
food, rest and care necessary to fit him for the 
next day's w·o.rk, he would therefore then be about 
the master's business and in the course of his 
employment? We see no difference in principle 
between the two situations.'' 
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To the same effect is the case of Nussbaum v. Trawng 
Label and Lithograph Company, 46 Cal. App. 561, in 
which the court said at page 571: 
''If the rule he extended to hold the master 
liable for the negligent acts of a servant while 
on his way to report for duty in the morning, 
the master would als-o be liable for the negligent 
acts of the servant while preparing his dinner-
pail before leaving his home, because he is then 
preparing, or, in a sense, on his way to report 
for ·duty; and, also the master under such a rule, 
would be liable £or the negligent act of a servant 
from the time he arose from his bed in the morn-
ing in p·reparation to report for his day's duties. 
The statement of such a rule reduces it to an 
absurdity.'' 
It has thus been the settled law of this state for 
many years that in an action against an employer for 
injuries negligently caused by his employee when he is 
traveling from his home to his place of employment in 
the vehicle which he must use in performing his duties 
of employment the employer is not liable, because the 
employee is not acting in the course of his employment. 
That view is not peculiar to this state, as appears from 
the result recently reached by the Washington court in 
the . c·a.rr·oll case, · and in the many other ·Cases herein 
cited.· 
Inasmuch as in the two -cases last referred to, the 
employee was required to op·erate a vehicle, there was a 
stronger combination of facts in favor of the employee 
than in the ·case at bar, but yet the court, in each of these 
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cases, held that the. employee was not within the scope 
of his employment during- his absence fron1 his duties~ 
The last expression of this court upon the subject 
of liability of the employer to third parties is to be 
found in the ·case of Sa~t~s v. Affleck, 102 P. (2d) 493, 
. t 
w·herein this eourt held that the employee, at the time 
of the injury to a third person, was acting outside of 
the scope of his employment and, hence, the doctrine 
of respondeat superior was not applicable. The evidence 
in that ~case was clear as it is in this case • that the 
employee had departed from the scope ·o.f his employ-
ment. In that case, just as in this case, the vehicle 
operated by the employee was owned by the employer. 
However, in that case it was the . regular duty of the 
employee to operate the deliver truck which, of course, 
is not the situation in this case. On the contrary, it 
.appears that in this ·case the employee, Harris, took the 
motorcycle without permission. In the case referred 
to, this court said that the p·resumption of the agency of 
the driver arising from proof of ownership by the em-
ployer was overcome by .clear, convincing a~nd con-
·Clusive evidence that the ·truck was not at the time of 
the accident being operated on the employer's business, 
but was being driven by the employee ·on an errand of 
his own, and, hence, as a matter ·o.f law, the employer 
was not liable. Such is the situation in this case and this 
court, as a 1natter of law, should decide in accordance 
with the uncontradicted evidence that at the time of the 
accident the defendant was not within the scope of his 
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employment and that, therefore; the· decision of the 
Industrial C·o-mmission herein should he annulled. 
While additional cases might be -cited from Utah 
and other jurisdictions, further citation of authorities 
would seem unnecessary. There is no case, which we 
have been able to discover, which questions the authority 
of the above cases, or which departs fr·om the principles 
es~ablished by those cases. 
As hereinbefore pointed out, the decision in this 
ease that the employee was in the course of his employ-
ment at the time he was injured is particularly vital 
because it involves not only the liability of an employer 
for workmen's c·ompensation for injuries not heretofore 
considered or established as compensable, but also f.or 
liability to third persons who have been negligently in-
jured by his employee under similar circumstances. It 
has heretofore been assumed by all concerned that the 
decisions in this state have determined that the estab-
lished law in this state is that there is no liability of 
the employer to third pers·ons or to the employee himself 
where the injury occurs before the employee ha·s reached 
his place of employment when at the time he is on an 
errand of his nwn and not under the -control or direction 
of the employer. Such decisions are in accord with 
those of the courts of last resort of every state where the 
problem has arisen. As hereinbefore pointed out, the 
decision is directly opposite and contrary to the rule 
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established by this court in the case of Fidelity and 
Casualty Compam.y v. Commission, 79 Utah 189, 8 P. 
( 2d) 617. To justify the decision of the Commission in 
this case, it would follow that the law established in 
that case must be overrule,d and that this court must 
depart from similar de-cisions of the courts of last resort 
of every other state. 
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge that 
the a-vvard of the Industrial Commission herein be 
annulled and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIIAS L. DAY, 
CHARLES WELCH, JR., 
ARTHUR E. MoRETON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
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